As we are in severe economic times when people will be seeking to recover debts and enforcing security, and the threat of bankruptcy or corporate insolvency is high, one aspect of the law that will be potentially important is set off (or compensation as it is anachronistically called), particularly in an insolvency situation.

However, one of the difficulties in Scots law is that the Compensation Act 1592, which deals with set off, is now over 400 years old (and so predates company law legislation, for example); is not written in modern English; and is not easily accessible. Also, Scots law is somewhat disparate in that there is also the doctrine of "balancing of accounts in bankruptcy", which is a form of set off. (Of course, there is also contractual set off, which lenders tend to use in security documents).

Hence, I would like to suggest that the Scottish Law Commission look at the law which deals with what is commonly referred to, or would be recognised as, "set off", and put it on a legislative footing. In this regard, the various strands could be brought together, and the various names, such as, "compensation", or "balancing of accounts in bankruptcy" be combined under the more modern name of "set off", which, it is suggested, is what most people refer to it as, particularly business people. There is a need to modernise and update the law in this area, which is economically important.

Given that there is limited case law in this general area, a review by the SLC, with appropriate comparative study, would allow the law to be stated in a principled way.

Whilst I have a general preference for judge-made law over legislation, I think this is an area where legislation would be the best way forward, and the best way for this to happen would be a consultation paper by the SLC, with draft legislation.

I would be pleased if the Scottish Law Commission were minded to conduct a review of the law of hire of corporeal moveables in Scots law. As part of some research I was undertaking in this area, I was struck how little law there was available on the subject. Moreover, to the extent that there was law in relation to the implied terms of the contract of hire of corporeal moveables, it was clear that there was a degree of overlap between the common law of hire, the provisions of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 which applied to consumer hire agreements and the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 (which import statutory implied terms of the contract of hire). On occasion, the rules on implied terms appeared to repeat themselves and in some instances, there was an element of contradiction. Another factor was that much of the cases forming part of the common law of hire were particularly old. Therefore, my suggestion is that it would be useful if the SLC undertook a review of Scots law on this important aspect of commercial life and that it be brought up to date.

The law of privacy throughout the UK is in a state of development at present, with major advances in the last decade. These have been driven by the Human Rights Act 1998, which gave an impetus to article 8 ECHR, together with quasi-privacy legislation such as the Data Protection Act 1998.

However, while the law in England has evolved through the doctrine of breach of confidence to create what is in effect a new tort of "misuse of private information" (as per the House of Lords in Campbell v MGN), there have been very few cases on this point in Scots Law (X v BBC being one of the few). This has led to a potential disparity between privacy protection in Scotland and England, not least since there is very little authority in Scots law as to how article 8 would be applied here. This is obviously a concern in its own right, and it may also be one of the reasons why potentially Scottish privacy litigation heads south - as evidenced by the case of Murray v Big Pictures, which concerned photos taken of JK Rowling and her family in Edinburgh, but was litigated in London.

I would suggest that legislation is highly desirable here, to ensure that the law in Scotland is clarified in the absence of litigation - and to avoid the situation where pursuers prefer to be claimants, in order to benefit from the more extensive jurisprudence on this topic in England. I would be very keen for the Commission to investigate the need for privacy legislation in Scotland and the appropriate form of such legislation.

Related to this, I would also be very interested in a review of publicity rights in Scots law (and would be happy to provide greater detail on request), but I suspect this is less of a priority!

I would be very pleased to see the SLC carry out work in the area on heritable securities, particularly the enforcement of heritable securities. That our system permits three different mechanisms for enabling sale (calling up, notice of default, and s 24 of the 1970 Act) - two of which do not require court involvement seems illogical and inefficient - particularly given that recent legislative reforms to encourage debtor reform require debtor initiation of judicial proceedings (at the debtor's initial expense at a time when they are struggling to make payments on the underlying loan) to protect their position. Other areas of the law of heritable securities would benefit from review and potential clarification or reform (including for example consideration of the accessory principle as it applies to fluctuating debts).

Aspects of the law of co-ownership would also benefit from clarification. In other countries, for example, it is possible to lease a pro indiviso share. It is not clear if this is possible in Scotland. What is the extent of a co-owner's right to veto uses made by other co-owners? Is there a role for majority rule in the use of co-owned property? There is also some uncertainty about the potential remedies available to a pro indiviso owner wishing to escape from co-ownership. It is not clear if a pro indiviso owner can seek a court order to buy out the other owner(s) or whether the court can order a closed auction (where only the co-owners may bid)? Given that many people live in co-owned properties, and that increaisngly in housing developments owners are left with co-owned pieces of ground which are not always adequately regulated by the burdens within the development - clarification of the default law would be helpful.

I would strongly support the suggestion by Nicholas Grier that a consolidation of the statutory law relating to diligence be carried out. This would seem to fit within the SLC's statutory powers in relation to statute law revision, and would be a valuable exercise to make the law clearer and more accessible for debtors, creditors, advisers (legal and non-legal), sheriff officers, students, and commentators.

As some areas of the law of diligence remain in case law I would welcome a codification of the remaining areas if a substantial consolidation of relevant legislation is carried out in order to ensure that creditors, but particularly debtors know where they stand.

I would strongly support reform of contract law along the lines of the Draft Common Frame of Reference. My own suggestion would not be to aim for codification of Scots contract law along the lines of the DCFR. Rather, it could be used as an inspiration for the reform of many existing parts (this is, of course, what the DCFR is intended to provide - a toolbox or yardstick for use by European and national legislators). Containing both an enforceable unilateral obligation and a third party right, and with no requirement of consideration, the DCFR in many ways resembles Scots law. It would allow us to reform our own law of contract in a manner which is consistent with our theoretical foundations. There are certain keys points which could be considered. Possibly the most pressing case for reform is our out-dated contract terminology. Our archaic terms are confusing: rescission, repudiation, to resile, restitution. We would do well to consider using the transparent terms which the DCFR offers. Another issue which causes practising lawyers a great deal of difficulty is finding the law. An example is the law of services. Unless specific issues are governed in contractual drafting, it is a very difficult task to find the law. We would do well, I suggest to consider Book IV Part C of the DCFR with a view to reforming Scots law. It contains detailed and useful provisions covering many types of service contracts which are not specifically regulated in Scots law. Finally, there are a number of Scottish contract Bills in existence which have not been enacted. I am thinking here of the Bills concerning remedies, the rule in White and Carter (Councils) Ltd v McGregor and penalty clauses. The DCFR approach to each of these issues is a sensible one and, indeed, is similar to the recommendations of the Scottish Law Commission which were reflected in each Bill. Reform along the lines of the DCFR would allow us to pick up each of these reforms quickly and easily. There have been significant developments in case law concerning interpretation of contract and so I would suggest that there is less need to consider review in this area. In summary, the DCFR is worthy of the closest analysis by the Commission. Because the DCFR is, in effect, a reflection of the "best" rules of contract law found in Europe, any reform of Scots contract law should use it as the first point of reference.

I would also strongly support the suggestion that the Commission consider criminal law relating to partnerships. The root of the difficulties experienced by the Crown in Balmer & ors v Her Majesty's Advocate [2008] ScotHC HCJAC 44 was s38 of the Partnership Act 1890. The extent of this section is subject to an unacceptably high degree of doubt. This was illustrated very clearly by Lord Reed in Duncan v The MFV Marigold PD145 & ors 2006 CSOH 128, 2006 SLT 975. We are simply not clear on the powers of the partners following dissolution of the partnership. Are the powers simply a continuation of agency power, or do they mean that the partnership has some residual existence? The section has been interpreted as permitting some new transactions, for example, the sale of partnership assets, even though that seems to conflict with the actual wording of the section. As suggested by Lord Reed, there may be a difference between the law of Scotland and England here, which is to be avoided in an area such as partnership. The doubt surrounding s38 has contributed to the difficulties in prosecuting partners, but it is also causing unacceptable difficulties in commercial law in seeking to assess what partners are and are not entitled to do in the context of winding up the partnership. Of course, these difficulties could have been avoided if the scheme suggested by the Scottish Law Commission in their report of 2003 had been enacted, but we continue to wait (possibly in vain?) for progress on that front.

I would like to suggest that the SLC gives some consideration to the introduction of a system of registration of options over land in Scotland.

This would address some shortcomings in the Scottish system which does not presently offer a practical, commercial solution to the problem of gaining security over an option agreement regarding land in Scotland.

Current practice is that it is common for the option holder to request a standard security over the land. This is not a good solution as the grant of a standard security over the land in favour of the option holder is of no practical benefit to them as enforcement of the security only entitles them to sell the land to a third party - precisely the thing they wish to avoid and (ii) the grant of a standard security is a very onerous security and often does not reflect an equality in the balance of the relationship between land owner and option holder, not to mention that the landowner may not be able to grant a security due to a pre-existing security over the land in favour of a third party eg a bank. The result is that neither party end up with an arrangement which truly suits their requirements and reflects the commercial nature of the agreement.

In England the situation is easily dealt with as the English system of land registration allows for the grant of an option to be registered as a restriction on the title. This therefore provides adequate protection (in the vast majority of cases) for the option holder as a security of their position vis a vis the land covered by the option and relieves the landowner of having to grant a security over the land while retaining the practical benefit of effectively preventing them from selling the land until the restriction has been removed or the option holder has provided consent. I am not aware of any significant drawbacks of this system.

This Act is well outdated and needs reform. Why should I need to get a sex change in order to bring a claim against a colleagues who does the exact same job as me. It would also put an end to corporations manipulating their experienced staff by remunerating the new starts better. Pay should be based on length of service, experience and productivity to the company. Nothing else.

Although more UK and EU-wide, the topic of patentability of software is perhaps something that the Commission might be able to look at. At present the law is a bit of a mess, with judges creating bizarre rules which betray a lack of full understanding of the issues and of the realities of the software industry.

SMEs and independent developers are prejudiced by the current situation, whereby they cannot innovate for fear of reprisal from multinational corporations which use extensive portfolios of (often ill-gotten) patents as weapons against them. The patent system is intended to foster innovation, and while that works in many arenas, it does not in the software industry - an area of endeavour becoming increasingly important and ubiquitous in modern life.

Software patents hinder innovation not by their very nature, but because of the corporate practices engaged in by those with the necessary fiscal and market clout. This helps no-one except them, and indeed it hurts everyone under those top blue-chip tiers of the industry. This includes end-users typing away at their desks. Particularly in the current economic climate it's important that barriers to recovery are removed, and this is a big one.

I would love you to look into how to uphold the rights of fathers to have access to their children when living a considerable distance from them. And how to enforce the sheriff's ruling when the parent with the child (usually the mother) refuses to co-operate. The law is being continually flounted, ignored, made a mockery of. To have a sheriff's decision behind you appears to hold no water. Please look into this matter. The CSA has succeeded in getting fathers to pay, now someone has to succeed in getting mothers to obey, and the child's rights to come first!